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Abstract—High-availability of software systems requires auto-
mated handling of crashes in presence of errors. Failure-oblivious
computing is one technique that aims to achieve high availability.
We note that failure-obliviousness has not been studied in depth
yet, and there is very few study that helps understand why failure-
oblivious techniques work. In order to make failure-oblivious
computing to have an impact in practice, we need to deeply
understand failure-oblivious behaviors in software. In this paper,
we study, design and perform an experiment that analyzes the
size and the diversity of the failure-oblivious behaviors. Our
experiment consists of exhaustively computing the search space
of 16 field failures of large-scale open-source Java software. The
outcome of this experiment is a much better understanding of
what really happens when failure-oblivious computing is used,
and this opens new promising research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dependable computing is founded on four main engineering
activities [1]: fault prevention; fault removal, i.e. testing; fault
forecasting; and fault tolerance. The latter, fault tolerance, aims
at handling faults triggered in production. For instance, it is
common to observe error pages on the Internet while ordering
a laser pointer, registering to a conference, or installing a
new blogging platform. Fault tolerance aims at preventing
system crashes on occurrence of such errors. As such, it is
complementary to testing, as it takes care of the faults that
have not been discovered at testing time.
Failure-oblivious computing is one of the approaches for
fault tolerance [2]–[5]. To overcome software failures at
runtime, failure-oblivious computing techniques modify the
execution so that failures become less critical: instead of
crashing the whole system, only the current task fails and
the system remains available. For example, Rinard et al. [2]
have proposed a failure-oblivious model consisting of skipping
erroneous writes happening out of an array’s bounds. Another
example is probabilistic memory safety in DieHard [5], where
the execution modifications are controlled addition of blank
memory padding.
In this work, we address the following main limiting as-
sumption of existing works on failure-oblivious computing :
previous work in this area assumes that in response to a given
failure, there exists one and only one execution modification
to be applied. In practice, however, there can possibly exist
multiple failure-oblivious decisions to respond to a failure. As
an example, consider the null pointer exceptions in a high-level
language such as Java. To overcome the same null pointer
exception, one can imagine two different solutions: 1) one
can skip the execution of the statement where a null value
is about to be used, or 2) one can directly return to the
caller method. We scientifically investigate this assumption in
this paper. More specifically, we set up a conceptual failure-
oblivious computing framework in which this assumption does
not hold, i.e., several execution modifications exist within this
framework to respond to a failure.
Once we accept that there are multiple alternative execution
modifications to the same failure, this naturally leads to the
novel and promising concept of “search space of failure-
oblivious computing”. The basic search space for a single
failure is simply composed of all possible execution modifica-
tions. However, now consider the presence of multiple failures
occurring in a row in a single execution, then the search space
becomes the cartesian product of all possible decisions over
each failure point. To exhaustively explore this search space,
we propose an algorithm called FO-EXPLORE.
We then setup an experiment to systematically study the
failure-oblivious search space of 16 field failures of large-scale
open-source Java software. We run those field failures in a
virtual endless loop that simulates the same failure happening
again and again. Each execution offers us a possibility to
explore a new patch in the search space, where a patch
is composed by a sequence of execution modifications. The
outcome of the experiment is the exact topology, for a given
failure-oblivious model, of the failure-oblivious computing
search space of the considered failures.
The experimental result shows that the failure-oblivious
search space is in general large and not easy to explore: this
experiment represents more than 10 days of computation in
a distributed scientific grid. For all the 16 considered field
failures, we identify a total of 8460 different failure-oblivious
execution modifications which are composed of 1 up to 8
execution modifications taken in a row. As an example, let us
consider a field failure of Apache Commons Collections, an
open-source Java project. This field failure, reported as issue
#360, is a null pointer exception. For this failure, our proposed
exploration algorithm FO-EXPLORE finds that there exist 45
different failure-oblivious execution modifications.
To sum up, the contributions of this paper are:
• The characterization of the concept of “search space of
failure-oblivious computing”.
• An algorithm to exhaustively explore this novel search
space.
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• An implementation of the algorithm for exhaustively
exploring the failure-oblivious computing search space
for null pointer dereferences in Java.
• The systematic empirical study of the failure-oblivious
computing search space for 16 real null dereference
failures, reported on a public issue tracker on large and
used Java libraries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II motivates the study of the failure-oblivious computing
search space. Section III details our exploration algorithm.
Section IV details the evaluation on 16 field null dereferences.
Section V details the threats to validity of the contribution.
Section VI presents the related works and Section VII con-
cludes. This paper is a complete rewrite of an Arxiv version
[6].
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Let us consider the example in Listing 1, which is an
excerpt of server code that retrieves the last connection date
of a user and prints the result to an HTML page. Method
getLastConnectionDate first gets the user session, and
then retrieves the last connection date from the session ob-
ject. This code snippet can possibly trigger two failures that
can crash the request: 1) if the session does not exist and
getUserSession returns null, then there is a null pointer
exception at line 3 (NPE1), and 2) for the first connection,
getLastConnection returns null, and another null pointer
exception can be thrown at line 6 (NPE2).
Now let us consider the possible execution modifications to
overcome the failures. In Listing 1, to overcome NPE1 at line
3, a failure-oblivious system could modify the execution state
and flow in three ways: 1) it creates a new session object on
the fly, and 2) it returns an arbitrary Date object such as the
current date, and 3) it returns null. As the example suggests,
there are multiple possible failure-oblivious strategies for the
same failure. However, note that not all such modifications
are equivalent. For instance, if modification #3 is applied, it
triggers another failure NPE2, whereas solutions #1 and #2 do
not further break the system state. This indicates that not all
state modifications are equivalent, some being invalid.
In this paper, we define a conceptual framework and an
exploration algorithm to reason about the presence of multiple
competing execution modifications in response to a failure.
Listing 1: Code Excerpt with Two Potential Null Dereference
Failures
1 Date getLastConnectionDate() {
2 Session session = getUserSession();
3 return session.getLastConnection(); // NPE1
4 }
5 ...
6 HTML.write(getLastConnectionDate().toString()); // NPE2
III. EXPLORING THE SEARCH SPACE OF
FAILURE-OBLIVIOUS COMPUTING
We have shown that there is an implicit search space
in failure-oblivious computing. In this section, we formally
define this search space and devise an algorithm to explore it
exhaustively.
A. Basic Definitions
Failure-oblivious computing [2] is the art of changing a
program’s state or flow during execution such that a crashing
failure does not happen anymore and that the program is able
to continue its execution, and it is sometimes referred to as
runtime repair [7], state repair [8] and self-healing software
[9]. As the terminology of failure-oblivious computing can
hardly be considered as stable, we thus first define its core
terms and concepts.
Definition: A failure point is the location in the code where
a failure is triggered. In the simplest case, a failure point is a
statement at a given line.
Definition: A failure-oblivious model defines a type of fail-
ure and the corresponding possible manners to overcome the
failure. For instance, a failure-oblivious model that considers
out-of-bounds write in arrays can skip the array upon failures.
Definition: A failure-oblivious strategy defines how a
failure is handled. The traditional failure-oblivious literature
assumes that there is one single way to be oblivious to a
failure. However, there are types of failures for which there
exist multiple failure-oblivious strategies. For example, upon
an out-of-bounds read in an integer array, one can return either
a constant or a value that presents somewhere else in the array.
This makes two different strategies.
Definition: A context-dependent failure-oblivious strat-
egy is a strategy that can be instantiated in multiple ways
depending on the execution context. For example, upon an
out-of-bounds read in an integer array, one can return the first,
the second, . . . , up to the nth value that presents in the array,
meaning that there are n ways to instantiate this strategy.
Definition: A failure-oblivious decision is the application
of a specific failure-oblivious strategy to handle a failure at
a specific failure point. A failure-oblivious decision is an
execution modification.
B. The Failure-oblivious Computing Search Space
Taking a failure-oblivious decision means exploring a new
program state after the first failure. The execution proceeding
from this new program state can result in a new failure, for
which a failure-oblivious decision has to be taken as well.
Definition: A failure-oblivious decision sequence is a
sequence of failure-oblivious decisions that are taken in a row
during one single execution because of cascading failures.
In this paper, an execution consisting of a single failure-
oblivious decision is called a unary decision sequence, and
a composite (or n-ary) decision sequence contains at least
2 decisions. We use Listing 1 to give an example of n-ary
failure-oblivious decision sequence. At line 3, the execution
of the method can be stopped by returning null to overcome
a null pointer exception when session is null, later on in the
execution, a new Date can be crafted to handle the second null
pointer exception at line 6. In certain cases, only one decision
in isolation may not be enough to overcome the failure, only
the sequence is a solution.
The notion of context-aware decision and decision sequence
naturally defines a search space.
Definition: The failure-oblivious computing search space
of a failure-triggering input is defined by all possible decision
sequences that can happen after the first failure.
C. FO-EXPLORE: An Algorithm to Explore the Failure-
oblivious Computing Search Space
After defining the failure-oblivious computing search space,
we now present an algorithm to exhaustively explore this
search space. The algorithm is named FO-EXPLORE and is
shown in Algorithm 1.
1) Algorithm Input-Output: FO-EXPLORE requires four
inputs which we explain in detail below.
Program P: a program to which failure-oblivious support
will be injected. The program is automatically transformed so
as to support failure-oblivious execution. The transformation
also adds intercession hooks to steer and monitor failure-
oblivious decisions.
Failure Triggering Input I: an input triggering a runtime
failure. We assume that we have at least one program input
that enables us to automatically reproduce the failures as many
times as we want. An input can be a set of values given to
a function. In an object-oriented program, an input is much
more than values only, it is a set of created objects, interacting
through a sequence of method calls.
Failure-oblivious Model R: a model listing the possible
modifications on the program state or execution flow to handle
the failure as defined above.
Validity Oracle O: an oracle specifying the viability of the
computation if failure-oblivious computing happens. A validity
oracle is a predicate on the program state at the end of program
execution on the failure-triggering input. The goal of the
validity oracle is to validate or invalidate the failure-oblivious
decision sequence that has happened during execution. In
failure-oblivious computing, the traditional validity oracle is
the absence of crashing errors, but more advanced ones can be
defined (e.g., use additional assertions). For instance, consider
again the example in Listing 1 where the validity oracle is
the presence of an exception that results in HTTP code 500.
Returning null is a failed unary decision sequence because the
request crashes with NPE1. On the contrary, returning a fresh
date object enables the request to succeed and the HTML to
be generated, making it a valid unary decision sequence.
Taking the above described four inputs, FO-EXPLORE
outputs a set of failure-oblivious decision sequences along with
their validity.
2) Algorithm Workflow: To explore the search space, the
basic idea behind FO-EXPLORE is to make a different deci-
sion according to the failure-oblivious model under consider-
Algorithm 1 The core exploration protocol FO-EXPLORE
Input: P: a program
Input: I: an input for P
Input: R: a failure-oblivious model
Input: O: a validity oracle
Output: S: a set of failure-oblivious decision sequences
1: f ailurePoints← /0
2: decisions← map f ailurePoint→decision
3: while last decision sequence was unknown do
4: seq← /0
5: exec P(I)
6: while failure f happens according to R do
7: if f /∈ f ailurePoints then
8: f ailurePoints← f ailurePoints∪ f
9: decisions[ f ]← computePossibleDecisions()
10: end if
11: select an unexplored or a not completely explored
decision d
12: seq← seq+d
13: apply d (change the state or flow)
14: proceed with execution
15: end while
16: store pair (decisionsequences,O(seq)) in S
17: end while
ation for each time a failure point is detected, and then collect
all decision sequences.
We now give a detailed description of the workflow. To
explore all the failure-obvious decisions sequences (line 3),
FO-EXPLORE executes the input that triggers the runtime
failure as much as it is required (line 5). Each time that the
failure is detected at a failure point ( f ) according to the failure-
oblivious model (line 6), FO-EXPLORE checks whether it has
already chosen a decision for the failure point ( f ) (line 7). If
no decision has been taken for the current failure point ( f )
before, FO-EXPLORE computes all the possible decisions for
the current failure point (line 9)1. Then FO-EXPLORE selects
an unexplored or a not completely explored decision (d) from
the computed available decisions (line 11). More specifically,
FO-EXPLORE can face two different selection cases:
Case 1: The failure point has never been detected before,
which means that the failure has never happened in this
location before. In this case, FO-EXPLORE selects the first
decision in the set of possible decisions.
Case 2: The failure has already been detected before at this
failure point in the program. In this case, FO-EXPLORE has
two possibilities: explore a new failure-oblivious decision or
use an already used decision that triggers a new failure point
which is not exhaustively explored.
Once a decision has been selected, FO-EXPLORE will
store it in the current decision sequence (line 12). Then FO-
EXPLORE applies the decision and resumes the execution of
1FO-EXPLORE uses the original NPEFix [10] algorithm to compute the
search space of a single failure point.
Figure 1: Excerpt of the decision tree of the example Listing 1.
One path is this tree is a “decision sequence”’. NPEX refers
to a failure point.
the program (lines 13-14). At the end of the execution, FO-
EXPLORE uses the validity oracle to determine the validity
of the execution and finally stores the result (line 16).
3) Working Example: We now illustrate the workflow of
FO-EXPLORE using the example in Listing 1. Figure 1
presents the actual decision tree of this example. Recall that
when FO-EXPLORE executes the request for the failing input,
a null pointer exception called NPE1 will be produced at line
3. This is shown as a circle “NPE1” in Figure 1. For this first
failure point (NPE1), FO-EXPLORE explores three different
decisions to handle the null pointer exception (the three arrows
coming out of NPE1 in Figure 1): 1) uses return null to
exit the getLastConnectionDate method, 2) uses return
new Date() to exit the method, and 3) uses session = new
Session() to initialize the null variable with a new instance
and proceeds with the execution of the same method. In cases
2) and 3), the execution does not produce other exceptions.
Now consider that FO-EXPLORE selects the first decision
(return null) and resumes the execution. This decision later
produces a second null pointer exception (NPE2 in Figure 1)
at line 6 in Listing 1. At this failure point, FO-EXPLORE
explores two decisions: 1) uses return to exit the execution
of the method and 2) uses new Date() to replace the null
expression getLastConnectionDate() with a new instance
of Date. The latter execution modification succeeds while the
former produces a failure. The former execution modification
fails as if FO-EXPLORE selects the return strategy at failure
point of NPE2, no response is sent to the client so that a
timeout will be produced on the client side.
At the end of the exploration, FO-EXPLORE eventually
discovers four different decision sequences (the four different
paths from Execution Start to Execution End in Figure 1), and
three of them produce an acceptable output.
D. Usefulness of Exploring the Search Space
Characterizing the search space of failure-oblivious comput-
ing can provide sound scientific foundations on future work on
failure-oblivious computing. Indeed, there is very little work
that studies to what extent and why failure-oblivious comput-
ing succeeds. By clearly defining and exploring the search
space, we obtain comprehensive data about this unresearched
phenomenon. The empirical results presented in Section IV is
a first step towards this direction.
In addition, by identifying multiple acceptable failure-
oblivious decision sequences, it opens a radically new per-
spective on failure-oblivious computing: there may be certain
decision sequences that are better than the others. In other
words, there are cases where one adds an additional criterion
on top of the validity oracle, and this criterion is used to select
the best failure-oblivious decision sequence. For instance, the
best decision sequence may be the one that runs the fastest. In
presence of multiple acceptable decision sequences, one needs
to characterize and explore the search space first in order to
select the best failure-oblivious decision sequence.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
The goal of the empirical evaluation presented in this section
is to study the failure-oblivious computing search space of real
failures occurring in large-scale open-source software. This
study is built on three research questions about the topology
of the search space.
RQ1. [Multiplicity] Does it exist multiple failure-oblivious
decision sequences for a given failure-triggering input? How
large is the corresponding search space? We want to un-
derstand if it is possible to apply different failure-oblivious
strategies to handle one specific failure. And if it is the case,
how many different decision sequences can be taken.
RQ2. [Fertility] What is the proportion of valid failure-
oblivious decision sequences? In the context of failure-
oblivious computing, there may exist different failure-
oblivious decision sequences that are all valid, i.e., they all fix
the runtime failure under consideration. To us, the proportion
of valid decision sequences can be considered as the “fertility”
of the search space. When the goal is to find at least one valid
decision sequence, it is much easier to do so if there are many
points in the search space that are valid. On the contrary, if
there is only one valid decision sequence in the search space,
it requires in the worst case visiting the complete search space
before finding the only valid decision sequence. The fertility
of the search space is the opposite of what is called “hardness”
or “constrainedness” in combinatorial optimization.
RQ3. [Disparity] To what extent does the search space
contain composite decision sequences? Our protocol identifies
a set of diverse failure-oblivious decision sequences, and some
of them require several decisions in a row. We will observe
whether there exist such composite failure-oblivious decision
sequences in our benchmark.
Table I: In our experiments, we consider a failure-oblivious
model for null dereference exceptions in Java. The model
consists of 6 possible strategies.
Strategy Id Description
replacement
reuse S1 injection of an existing compatible ob-
ject
creation S2 injection of a new object
sk
ip
pi
ng
line S3 skip statement
m
et
ho
d void S4a return a null or /0 to caller
creation S4b return a new object to caller
reuse S4c return an existing compatible object to
caller
A. Considered Failure-Oblivious Model
We have implemented FO-EXPLORE for null dereferences
in Java (aka null pointer exceptions) with a failure-oblivious
model derived from NPEFix [10]. In Java, all object variable
dereferences are potential failure points (field accesses, method
calls on local variables, method parameters, and implicit
casts). A decision has to be taken when the variable is null,
which means that failure points are activated if and only if
a null is going to be dereferenced. For each decision point,
NPEFix defines six failure-oblivious strategies, grouped into
two categories as shown in Table I. The first category consists
of replacing the null value by an alternative valid non-null
object of a compatible type. This category is composed of two-
sub-categories: 1) when a variable is null, one can reuse an
object from another variable in the scope instead, strategies of
this kind are called reuse-based strategies; 2) when a variable
is null, one can also create a new object on the fly, strategies
of this kind are called creation-based strategies. Note that the
number of possible decisions for reuse and creation based
strategies is parametrized by the number of variables and
the number of constructors available, which means that for
a single decision point, there are often dozens of different
available decisions. The second category is based on skipping
the execution of the code affected by the null dereference, one
can either skip the line that uses the null dereference or skip
the rest of the method. When skipping the rest of a method
which returns a value, one can also either reuse an existing
object or create one on the fly.
For more details on the strategies and the implementation,
we refer the readers to the NPEFix paper [10].
B. Benchmark
We need real and reproducible production failures to con-
duct the evaluation. To achieve this, we reuse the benchmark
of NPEFix [10] consisting of 16 field failures coming from
Apache projects. Table II presents the core statistics of our
benchmark. The first column contains the bug id. The second
column contains the SVN revision of the global Apache SVN.
The third column contains the number of lines of code. The
fourth column contains the total number of method calls before
the null pointer exception is triggered. For example, issue
Collections-360 fixed at revision 1076034 is an application
of 21650 lines of Java code.
Table II: Dataset of 16 bugs with null dereference in six
Apache open-source projects.
Bug ID SVN revision LOC # method callsbefore null
Collections-360 1076034 21650 13
Felix-4960 1691137 33057 2
Lang-304 489749 17277 2
Lang-587 907102 17317 10
Lang-703 1142381 19047 9
Math-1115 1590254 90782 328
Math-1117 1590251 90794 342
Math-290 807923 38265 88
Math-305 885027 38893 8
Math-369 940565 41082 7
Math-988A 1488866 82442 136
Math-988B 1488866 82443 134
PDFBox-2812 1681643 67294 37
PDFBox-2965 1701905 64375 54
PDFBox-2995 1705415 64821 37
Sling-4982 1700424 1182 2
Total: 16 failures from
6 open-source large projects 770721 1209
Let us dwell on the last column, the number of executed
method calls before the dereference happens. It gives an
intuition on the complexity of the setup required to reproduce
the field failure. As shown in Table II, there are between 2
and 342 methods (application methods, not counting JDK and
API methods) called for the reproduced field failures under
consideration, with an average of 75.56. This indicates that the
failures in our benchmark are not simple tests with a trivial
call to a method with null parameters.
C. Experimental Protocol
The experiment is based on the exhaustive exploration of
the search space of failure-oblivious decision sequences, as
defined by our failure-oblivious model for null pointer excep-
tions described in Section IV-A. It is done on the benchmark
of failures presented in Section IV-B.
1) Exhaustive exploration: We apply algorithm FO-
EXPLORE to build the complete decision tree of all failures
in our benchmark. Recall that the exploration of the failure-
oblivious research space is done as follows: 1) We instrument
each buggy program of our benchmark with our failure-obliv-
ious model; 2) We execute each instrumented program with
the test case that encodes the field failure; 3) We collect all
decisions taken at runtime; and finally 4) We execute the
validity oracle at the end of the test case execution.
The time required to perform such an experiment is approx-
imately the size of the search space multiplied by the time
for reproducing the failure. Note the alternative computation
that comes after the first failure-oblivious decision at the first
failure point is added on top of this.
The raw data of this evaluation is publicly available on
GitHub2. We answer all research questions based on this data.
2 https://github.com/Spirals-Team/runtime-repair-experiments/
2) Validity of Failure-Obliviating Decision Sequences: For
a given decision sequence taken in response to a failure, we
assess its validity according to the oracle. In our experiments,
the validity oracle is directly extracted from the test case
reproducing the field failure: a decision sequence is considered
as valid if no null pointer exception and no other exceptions
are thrown. A decision sequence is considered as invalid if the
original null pointer exception is thrown (meaning that there is
no possible decision at the failure point), or another exception
is thrown and not caught. When the test case contains domain-
specific assertions beyond whether exceptions occur, we keep
them and a decision sequence is considered as valid if all
assertions pass after the application execution modifications.
This is the case for 14/16 failures.
D. Results to Research Questions
1) RQ1. [Multiplicity] Does it exist multiple failure-
oblivious decision sequences for a given failure-triggering
input? How large is the corresponding search space?: We
analyze the data obtained with the experiment described in
Section IV-C1, consisting of exhaustively exploring the search
space of execution modifications for 16 null dereferences.
Table III shows the core metrics we are interested in.
Table III reads as follows. Each line corresponds to a failure
of our benchmark. Each column gives the value of a metric of
interest. The first column contains the name of each bug. The
second column contains the number of encountered decision
points for this failure. The third column contains the number of
possible failure-oblivious decision sequences for this failure.
The fourth column contains the number of execution modifica-
tions (valid decision sequences for which the oracle has stated
that the decision sequence has worked). The fifth column
contains the percentage of valid decision sequences. the sixth
column contains the minimum/median/maximum number of
decisions taken for valid decision sequences.
For example, the first line of Table III details the result
for bug Collections-360. To overcome this failure at runtime,
there are two possible decision points, which, when they are
systematically unfolded, correspond to 45 possible decision
sequences, 16 of which are valid according to the oracle. The
size of the valid decision sequences is always equal to 2, which
means that there must be two decisions taken in a row to
handle the failure.
Our experiment is the first to show that there exist multiple
alternative decisions to overcome a failure at runtime, as
shown by the number of explored decision sequences. The
number is exactly the size of our search space when we
conduct an exhaustive exploration. In this experiment, it ranges
between 4 decisions (for Math-305 and PdfBox-2965) to 576
for Math-988A and 51785 for Math-1117. Overall, we notice
a great variance of the size of the search space.
We also see in Table III that there is a correlation between
the number of activated decision points for a given failure
and the number of possible decision sequences. For instance,
for Felix-4960, there is only one activated decision point (at
the failure point where the null pointer exception is about to
happen), and 10 possible decisions can be taken at this point.
On the contrary, Math-1117 has the biggest number of acti-
vated decision points (21), which also has the biggest number
of decision sequences (51785). This correlation is expected
and explained analytically as follows. Once a first decision is
made at the failure point (where the null dereference is about
to happen), many alternative execution paths are uncovered.
Then, a combinatorial explosion of stacked decisions happens.
If we assume that there are 5 alternative decisions at the first
decision point and that each of them in turn triggers another
decision point with 10 alternative decisions, it directly results
in 5×10= 50 possible decision sequences. Now, if we assume
n decision points with m possible decisions on average, this
results in mn decision sequences, which is a combinatorial
explosion. In general, the size of the search space depends on:
1) the overall number of decision points activated for a given
failure, 2) the number of possible decisions at each decision
point, 3) and the correlation between different decision points,
that is the extent to which one decision taken at a decision
point influences the number of possible subsequent decisions
to be taken. For failures with large number of explored
decision sequences, it means that failure-oblivious computing
unfolds a large number of diverse program states and their
corresponding subsequent executions.
Answer to RQ1. We have performed an exhaustive ex-
ploration to draw a precise picture of the failure-oblivious
computing search space. The result clearly shows that
there exist multiple alternative failure-oblivious decision
sequences to handle null dereferences. In our experiment,
there are 11/16 failures for which we observe more than 10
possible decision sequences (column “Nb possible decision
sequence”) for the same failure and according to our
execution modification model, with a maximum value of
51785 (for Math-1117).
2) RQ2. [Fertility] What is the proportion of valid failure-
oblivious decision sequences?: We now have a clear picture
of the size of the failure-oblivious search space, and are
interested in further knowing whether there exist multiple valid
decision sequences in that space. To do so, we still consider the
exhaustive study protocol described in Section IV-C1 whose
results are given in Table III. We concentrate especially on
the fourth column which shows the number of valid decision
sequences. We compare it against the column representing the
size of the search space, i.e., the total number of possible
decision sequences. For instance, for Collections-360, the
search space contains 45 possible decision sequences, among
which 16 are valid according to the oracle (the absence of
null pointer exception and the two assertions at the end of the
test case reproducing the failure pass), i.e., a proportion of
16/45 = 36% of decision sequences in the search space are
valid.
We notice several interesting extreme cases in Table III.
First, there are two failures – Lang-587 and PdfBox-2995 –
for which only 1 valid decision sequence exists. In addition,
Table III: Key metrics of the failure oblivious search space according to FO-EXPLORE.
RQ1 RQ2/RQ3
Bug ID Nb encountereddecision points
Nb possible
decision
sequence
Nb valid
decision
sequence
% decision
sequence
| Valid decision seq..|
Min. Med. Max.
Collections-360 2 45 16 35,5% 2 2 2
Felix-4960 1 10 4 40% 1 1 1
Lang-304 1 7 6 35,5% 1 1 1
Lang-587 1 28 1 3,0% 1 1 1
Lang-703 4 459 130 28,3% 2 2 2
Math-1115 1 5 5 100% 1 1 1
Math-1117 21 51785 7708 14,9% 7 8 8
Math-290 1 14 4 28,6% 1 1 1
Math-305 1 4 3 75% 1 1 1
Math-369 2 14 0 0% — — —
Math-988A 3 576 383 66,5% 1 2 3
Math-988B 1 32 17 53,1% 1 1 1
Pdfbox-2812 8 294 168 57,1% 1 6 7
Pdfbox-2965 1 4 3 75% 1 1 1
Pdfbox-2995 1 5 1 20% 1 1 1
Sling-4982 2 16 11 68,7% 1 1 1
Total 51 53298 8460 15,9% 1 1 8
there is one failure for which all decision sequences remove
the failure. This is Math-1115 for which all 5 possible decision
sequences are valid.
Let us dwell on this proportion of valid decision sequences
in the search space. This proportion depends on the strength
of the considered oracle. In failure-oblivious computing, the
oracle that is classically considered is the absence of runtime
exceptions: we call this oracle the default oracle. In this
experiment, we have an oracle that subsumes this default
oracle as we also use assertions at the end of the test that
reproduces the failure. We have manually inspected the tests
and found that not all tests have equally strong assertions,
which partly explains the variations in fertility we observe.
Answer to RQ2. In our benchmark, the proportion of valid
decision sequences varies from 0 to 100% (from 0/14 to 5/5
valid execution modifications). This great variation is due
to strength of the considered oracle, and the complexity of
the code at the failure point.
3) RQ3. [Disparity] To what extent does the search space
contain composite decision sequences?: We have shown in
RQ2 that there are multiple valid execution modifications.
Now, we study their complexity as measured by the number
of decisions involved in the execution modification. To do so,
we again study the results of the exhaustive study protocol
described in Section IV-C1 whose results are given in Table III.
We especially concentrate on the column showing that among
the set of valid decision sequences, what is the minimum,
median and maximum size (recall that the size is the number of
decisions in the decision sequence). For instance, for PDFBox-
2812, the minimal size in number of decisions among all valid
failure-oblivious decision sequences is 1, the median size is 6
and the maximal size is 7.
We have the following findings from this data. First, for
5/16 failures of our benchmark, we see that there exist
failure-oblivious decision sequences composed of more than
one decision. Since our failure-oblivious model is specific
to null pointer exceptions, it means that there exist failures
for which the null dereference problem is not solved by the
first decision, and that another null dereference happens later.
Among the 5 failures, the failure-oblivious decision sequences
are of the same size 2 for two failures (Collections-360, Lang-
703). For the remaining 3 failures (Math-988A, PDFBox-2812,
Math-1117), there are failure-oblivious decision sequences of
different size. For instance, for Math-988A, there exist failure-
oblivious decision sequences of 1, 2 and 3 decisions. Second,
for 10/16 failures of our benchmark, the failure-oblivious
decision sequences are always composed of a single decision.
This is strongly correlated with the size of the search space
(third column, number of decision sequences), indicating that
the test case reproducing the production failure sets up a
program state that is amenable to failure-oblivious computing.
Finally, for one failure (Math-369), even though there are
several decisions taken, but none of them are valid. All
decision sequences are invalidated by the oracle (the assertions
of the test case reproducing the field failure).
An interesting question is whether one needs to apply differ-
ent strategies in the same execution to get an acceptable result.
Figure 2 presents the number of different repair strategies that
are used in valid decision sequences. We see that 76% of valid
decision sequences mix at least two different strategies, this
clearly hints that mixing different strategies is important for
effective failure oblivious computing.
Example of Math-988A: Now we illustrate the disparity of
the number of decision sequences for the bug Math-988A.
The initial null pointer exception is triggered in the return
statement of method toSubSpace which returns an object of
type Vector1D (see line 182 in Listing 3). The null pointer
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Figure 2: The number of valid decision sequences that use
between 1 and 5 different repair strategies. We exclude Math-
1117 for better visibility.
Figure 3: Excerpt of the decision tree of Math-988A. One path
in this tree is a “decision sequence”’. This figure clearly shows
the presence of paths with multiple steps, i.e., the presence of
compound decision sequences.
Listing 2: The human patch for Math-988A.
@@ SubLine.java
116 // compute the intersection on infinite line
117 Vector2D v2D = line1.intersection(line2);
118 +if (v2D == null) {
119 + return null;
120 +}
121
122 // check location of point with respect to first sub-
line
123 Location loc1 = getRemainingRegion().checkPoint(line1.
toSubSpace(v2D));
Listing 3: The decision points of Math-988A.
@@ Line.java
181 Vector1D toSubSpace(Vector2D point) {
182 return new Vector1D(cos * point.getX() /* NPE1*/ + sin
* p2.getY() /* NPE2*/);
183 }
@@ OrientedPoint.java
57 double getOffset(Vector2D point) {
58 double delta = ((Vector1D) point).getX() /* NPE3*/ -
location.getX();
59 return direct ? delta : -delta;
60 }
Listing 4: The patch equivalent to a valid failure-oblivious
decision taken for Math-988A.
@@ Line.java
181 Vector1D toSubSpace(Vector2D point) {
182 + if (point == null) {
183 + return Vector1D.NaN;
184 + }
185 return new Vector1D(cos * point.getX()
186 + sin * p2.getY());
187 }
exception is triggered when a Vector2D parameter is null
and methods getX and getY are called on it. The Vector2D
parameter is computed by the line 117 in Listing 2 and then
passes as argument to the method toSubSpace at line 123
in Listing 2. If two lines do not have an intersection, the
geometrical computation of the intersection of them in line
117 of Listing 2 is null and will then cause the null pointer
exception.
There are three failure points for this bug as shown in
Table III, which means that there are potentially between 1 and
3 null pointer exceptions happening during the execution of the
failure input depending on the selected decisions. The source
code of these failure points are shown in Listing 3, and the
different decision sequences are illustrated in the decision tree
in Figure 3. In this figure, each node represents a failure point,
each arrow represents a decision, and each path between the
Execution Start and the Execution End represents a decision
sequence.
For Math-988A, there are different kinds of failure-oblivious
decision: 1) initialize the null parameter with a new instance
(1 decision point), 2) use a new and disposable instance of
Vector2D at both places where the null parameter is used (2
decision points), 3) return null either at the first NPE location
or at the second one, triggering another decision in the caller
(between 2 and 3 decision points), and 4) return a new instance
Vector1D (1 decision point).
For Math-988A, the reproducing test contains JUnit as-
sertions for checking the expected correct behavior, which
should return null when no intersection exists. In case the
failure-oblivious decisions pass those assertions, it means that
failure-oblivious computing achieves full correctness and these
decisions are illustrated with “OK” in Figure 3. Otherwise if
the failure-oblivious decisions fail on the assertions or trigger
another failure, then these decisions do not fully achieve the
purpose of failure-oblivious computing and are illustrated with
“Failure” in Figure 3. As an example, Listing 4 shows a valid
failure-oblivious decision written in a patch equivalent form.
Answer to RQ3. For 5/16 failures of our benchmark, the
search space contains composite failure-oblivious decision
sequences that have more than one decision. For 3/16
failures, the possible failure-oblivious decision sequences
have disparate sizes, and our protocol enables us to identify
all valid failure-oblivious decision sequences.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
We now discuss the threats to validity of our experiment.
First, let us discuss internal validity. Our experiment is of
computational nature, and consequently, a bug in our code
may threaten the validity of our results. However, since all
our experiment code is publicly available for sake of open-
science3, future researchers will be available to identify these
potential bugs.
Second, a threat to the external validity relates to the number
of failures considered. Our experiment has considered 16 fail-
ures from 6 different software projects. Recall that reproducing
field failures is a very costly task and consequently, there
is a research trade-off between cost and external validity.
However, our experiment considers as many or more failures
than the related work on failure-oblivious computing. For
external validity, it may also be asked whether our results
are specific to Java and whether the search space of failure-
oblivious computing search space has the same structure in
other programming languages and runtime environments. In
our opinion, this is an interesting threat to external validity
that calls for more research in this area.
VI. RELATED WORK
Long and Rinard [11] study the search space of patch
generation systems. In our work, we consider failure-oblivious
decision sequences, which are fundamentally different: while
a code patch is a permanent modification to the behavior, a
failure-oblivious decision sequence only impacts one single
execution, with no effect or regression on subsequent ex-
ecutions, even if they execute the same statement. What’s
interesting is that in both cases, contrary to the initial intuition
of the research community, there is a multiplicity of possible
patches. Long and Rinard’s paper is the first one to study
this for static patches, our paper is possibly the first one to
comprehensively show that this phenomenon exists for failure-
oblivious decision sequences.
There are several automatic recovery techniques. One of the
earliest techniques is Ammann and Knight’s “data diversity”
[12], that aims at enabling the computation of a program in the
presence of failures. The idea of data diversity is that, when
a failure occurs, the input data is changed so that the new
input resulting from the change does not result in the failure.
3 https://github.com/Spirals-Team/runtime-repair-experiments
The assumption is that the output based on this artificial input,
through an inverse transformation, remains acceptable in the
domain under consideration. The input transformations can
be seen as a kind of failure-oblivious model. As such, our
protocol could be used to reason on the search space of data
diversity.
Demsky et al. [13] present a language for the specification
of data structure invariants. The invariant specification is used
to verify and repair the consistency of data structure instances
at runtime. In their work, Demsky et al. do not study the
associated search space.
Rinard et al. [2] presents a technique to avoid illegal mem-
ory accesses by adding additional code around each memory
operation during the compilation process. For example, the
additional code verifies at runtime that the program only uses
the allocated memory. If the memory access is outside the
allocated memory, the access is ignored instead crashing with
a segmentation fault. We apply different decisions to handle a
given failure (and not a single code, hard-coded in the injected
code), and we use an oracle to reason about the viability of
the decision.
Perkins et al. [14] proposes ClearView, a system for auto-
matically handling errors in production. The system consists
of monitoring the system execution on low-level registers to
learn invariants. Those invariants are then monitored, and if
a violation of an invariant is detected ClearView forces the
restoration. From an engineering perspective, the difference is
we reason on decision sequences, while ClearView analyzes
each decision in isolation. From a scientific perspective, our
work finely characterizes the search space and the outcomes of
failure-oblivious computing based on execution modification.
Rx [15] is a runtime repair system based on changing
the environment upon failures. Rx employs checkpoint-and-
rollback for re-executing the buggy code when failures happen.
The differences are as follows: 1) Rx does not change the
execution itself but the environment 2) the search space of Rx
is smaller (a set of predefined strategies) 3) Rx’ experiment
does not include systematic exploration of the search space.
Kling et al. [16] propose Bold a system to detect and
escape infinite and long-running loops. On user demand, Bolt
is attached to a running application and tries different strategies
to escape the infinite loop. If a strategy fails, Bolt uses rollback
to restore the state of the application and then tries the next
strategy. Bolt does not reason about decision sequences as we
do in this paper.
Long et al. [4] introduces the idea of “recovery shepherding”
in a system called RCV. Upon certain errors (null dereferences
and divide by zero), recovery shepherding consists in returning
a manufactured value, as for failure-oblivious computing. The
key idea of recovery shepherding is to track the manufactured
values so as to see 1) whether they are passed to system calls
or files and 2) whether they disappear. The key difference
with our work lies in the reasoning about the effect of the
combinations (by storing and keeping information about the
actual valid decision sequences).
Jula et al. [17] presents a system to defend against deadlocks
at runtime. The system first detects synchronization patterns
of deadlocks, and when the pattern is detected, the system
avoids re-occurrences of the deadlock with additional locks.
The pattern detection is related to the detector of instances
of the fault model under consideration. However, Jula et al.
do not explore and compare alternative locking strategies. We
note that our protocol may be plugged on top of their systems
to explore the search space of locking sequences.
Hosek and Cadar [18] switch between application versions
when a bug is detected. This technique can handle failures
because some bugs disappear while others appear between
versions. We can also use our protocol to systematically
explore the sequences of runtime jumps across versions.
Assure [19] is a self-healing system based on checkpointing
and error virtualization. Error virtualization consists of han-
dling an unknown and unrecoverable error with error handling
code that is already present in the system yet designed for
handling other errors. While Assure does self-healing by
opportunistic reuse of already present recovery code, our
failure-oblivious model handles failures by modifying the state
or flow.
Carzaniga et al. [20] repair web applications at runtime
with a set of manually written, API-specific alternatives rules.
This set can be seen as a hardcoded set of failure-oblivious
decision sequences. On the contrary, we do not require a list of
alternatives but instead relies on an abstract failure-oblivious
model that is automatically instantiated at runtime.
Berger and Zorn [5] show that is possible to effectively
tolerate memory errors and provide probabilistic memory
safety by randomizing the memory allocation and providing
memory replication. Exterminator [21] provides more sophis-
ticated fault tolerance than [5] by performing fault localization
before applying memory padding. The work by Qin et al.
[22] exploits a specific hardware feature called ECC-memory
for detecting illegal memory accesses at runtime. The idea
of the paper is to use the consistency checks of the ECC-
memory to detect illegal memory accesses (for instance due to
buffer overflow). Both techniques are semantically equivalent
in the normal case. We have reasoned about the search
space of execution modifications that are not semantically
equivalent, where one taken decision can impact the rest of
the computation.
Dobolyi and Weimer [3] present a technique to tolerate null
dereferences. Using code transformation, they introduce hooks
to a recovery framework. This framework is responsible for
forwarding recovery of the form of creating a default object
of an appropriate type of skipping instructions. Kent [23]
proposes alternatives to null pointer exceptions. He proposes
to skip the failure line or exits the method by a return when a
null pointer exception is detected. In those two contributions,
there is no reasoning on the search space of failure-oblivious
computing, as done in this work.
Jeffrey et al. [24] present a technique to assist the developers
to locate the root cause of memory errors. In this work Jeffrey
at al. suppress the execution of the statement that produces the
failure and repeats this procedure until the execution of the
program does not fail. The last suppressed statement should
according to Jeffrey at al. be close to the root cause of
the memory error. This approach uses the failure-oblivious
strategy to continue the execution of the program in order
to gain knowledge. In this case, they want to identify the
root cause of the memory error. The main difference is that
Jeffrey et al. don’t use the failure-oblivious technique to fix
the application but to get knowledge during the execution
of the program. We focus on the failure-oblivious computing
search space to understand the failure-oblivious behavior and
we also consider different failure-oblivious strategies to handle
failures.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we characterized the key concept of search
space of failure-oblivious computing. In order to understand
the behavior of failure-oblivious computing, we proposed
an algorithm to exhaustively explore this search space. We
performed an empirical study on 16 real java bugs to draw a
precise picture of the nature of the failure-oblivious search-
space on reals bugs. We find out that there are several
possible execution modifications to handle a failure and several
execution modifications have to be taken in a row to handle
some specific failures.
We have now a better understating of the size of the failure-
oblivious search space, we plan to develop techniques to select
better state modifications in the future so that the capability
of failure-oblivious system in production environment can be
improved.
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